Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary 2026

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Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors. (2026 INSC 662) | Supreme Court Judgment Analysis

Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors. (2026 INSC 662) — Supreme Court Sets Aside 28-Year-Old Compromise Decree: Advocate Cannot Compromise Without Client's Express Authorisation

Case Details at a Glance

Case Name: Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 662 | 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol & Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date of Judgment: 1 July 2026
Case Type: Civil Appeal (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13671 of 2025)
Diary Number: 22669-2025
Key Legal Issue: Validity of compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC when signed by advocate without client's express authorisation
Outcome: Appeal dismissed; compromise decree set aside; matter remanded for full trial

In a landmark judgment delivered on 1 July 2026, the Supreme Court of India has sent a strong message to the legal fraternity: an advocate cannot enter into a compromise on behalf of a client without express authorisation. The case of Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors. (2026 INSC 662) is not just another civil appeal — it is a watershed moment that redefines the boundaries of an advocate's authority, the sanctity of compromise decrees, and the fundamental principle of voluntary consent in civil litigation.

This judgment, authored by Justice Sanjay Karol on behalf of a Division Bench also comprising Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, upheld the setting aside of a 28-year-old compromise decree passed in a partition suit. The Court held that when a lawyer signs a compromise petition without the client's express authority or signature, the resulting decree is contrary to law and cannot stand. The decision has far-reaching implications for every civil lawyer, litigant, and court in India.

In this comprehensive article, we will dissect the entire case — from its factual background to the legal reasoning, from the precedents relied upon to the practical lessons for advocates and litigants. Whether you are a law student preparing for competitive exams, a practicing advocate handling partition suits, or a litigant concerned about your rights, this analysis will give you a complete understanding of what this judgment means for the Indian legal system.

Background and Facts of the Case: How a Partition Suit Became a 37-Year Legal Battle

To truly understand the significance of this judgment, we must first walk through the facts. The story begins way back in 1989, when a partition suit was filed in a civil court. What followed was not a swift resolution, but a saga that would span nearly four decades, involving forged documents, alleged fraud, and a compromise that one party claimed they never agreed to.

The Original Partition Suit (1989)

The dispute revolved around ancestral property belonging to a common ancestor named Thakur Ojha. The plaintiff, Dinbandhu Ojha, filed Suit No. 128 of 1989 seeking a one-fourth share in the total property of Thakur Ojha. The suit was a typical partition case where multiple family members were arrayed as defendants, each claiming their respective shares in the ancestral estate.

Among the defendants was Chaturbhuj Chaudhary, who was made Defendant No. 5 in the suit. He appeared before the court through his advocate, Ram Krishna Mehta, whose vakalatnama was dated 27 August 1992. At this stage, everything appeared to be proceeding normally — a partition suit had been instituted, parties were represented by counsel, and the trial was underway.

The Compromise Petition (1994)

In February 1994, a dramatic turn occurred. A compromise petition was filed before the Sub-Judge, purportedly signed jointly by the plaintiffs and defendants. The petition claimed that the parties had mutually agreed to settle the dispute through compromise. Based on this petition, the trial court passed a compromise decree on 22 February 1994, effectively putting an end to the partition suit.

A final decree followed in 1997, giving legal finality to the compromise. For all practical purposes, the matter seemed closed. The parties had supposedly settled their differences, the court had recorded the compromise, and a decree had been passed. The case file was consigned to the record room, and life moved on — or so everyone thought.

The Challenge After 28 Years (2022)

Fast forward to 2022 — nearly 28 years after the compromise decree and 33 years after the original suit was filed. The legal heirs of Chaturbhuj Chaudhary (Defendant No. 5), represented by his successors, filed a Miscellaneous Case before the same trial court seeking to set aside the compromise decree. Their allegations were startling:

Chaturbhuj Chaudhary never signed the compromise petition. His signature was allegedly forged or completely absent from the document.
He never authorised his advocate to enter into any compromise on his behalf. The vakalatnama only gave the lawyer power to represent him in court, not to settle his property rights.
The vakalatnama and written statement relied upon were forged documents, fabricated to create the illusion of consent.
The entire compromise was obtained by fraud, depriving Defendant No. 5 of his legitimate share in the ancestral property.

The appellants before the Supreme Court — Krishna Kumar Ojha and others, who were the legal heirs of the original plaintiffs and other co-sharers — challenged the setting aside of the compromise decree. They argued that after 28 years, it was too late to reopen a settled matter. They contended that the compromise had been accepted by the court, a final decree had been passed, and the doctrine of finality attached to court decrees should protect the settlement.

The Trial Court and High Court Decisions: Why the Compromise Was Set Aside

Before reaching the Supreme Court, this case had already been through two levels of judicial scrutiny. Both the trial court and the Patna High Court found merit in the challenge raised by the legal heirs of Chaturbhuj Chaudhary.

Trial Court's Order

The trial court, upon examining the Miscellaneous Case filed in 2022, accepted the preliminary allegations at face value. It observed that:

The compromise petition did not bear the signature of Defendant No. 5, Chaturbhuj Chaudhary.
There was no document on record showing that Chaturbhuj Chaudhary had expressly authorised his counsel to enter into a compromise affecting his property rights.
The vakalatnama filed by the advocate was limited to representing the defendant in court proceedings and did not extend to compromising substantive rights.
The allegations of fraud and forgery prima facie appeared to be substantiated.

Based on these observations, the trial court allowed the petition and set aside the compromise decree. It held that a decree based on a compromise to which a party had not consented — either personally or through duly authorised representation — was a nullity in the eyes of law.

Patna High Court's Affirmation

The appellants filed a civil revision before the Patna High Court, challenging the trial court's order. However, the High Court refused to interfere. It affirmed the trial court's findings and held that:

The absence of the defendant's signature on the compromise petition was a fatal defect.
An advocate's general vakalatnama does not automatically confer authority to compromise a client's property rights.
Where fraud and forgery are alleged, and the basic requirements of a valid compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC are not met, the compromise decree cannot be allowed to stand.
The delay of 28 years, while significant, could not validate an inherently illegal compromise.

It was against this backdrop that the appellants approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition (SLP), which was converted into a Civil Appeal.

Issues Before the Supreme Court: The Core Legal Questions

When the matter came up before the Division Bench of the Supreme Court, several critical legal questions were framed for consideration:

Issue 1: Scope of an Advocate's Authority to Compromise

Does a general vakalatnama authorise an advocate to enter into a compromise on behalf of the client? Or is express, specific authorisation required for compromising property rights?

Issue 2: Mandatory Requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC

What are the essential prerequisites for a valid compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? Is the signature of each party mandatory, or can an advocate's signature substitute for the client's consent?

Issue 3: Effect of Delay on Challenging a Compromise Decree

Can a compromise decree be challenged after 28 years? Does the law of limitation bar such a challenge, or can it be overcome when the compromise itself is vitiated by fraud and lack of authority?

Issue 4: Remedy Available Against a Compromise Decree

What is the appropriate remedy when a compromise decree is found to be invalid? Can a fresh suit be filed, or must the parties approach the same court that recorded the compromise?

Supreme Court's Legal Reasoning: A Masterclass in CPC Interpretation

The Supreme Court's judgment is a masterful exposition of the law relating to compromise decrees. Justice Sanjay Karol, writing for the Bench, systematically analysed the statutory framework, judicial precedents, and the facts of the case to arrive at a conclusion that reinforces the sanctity of voluntary consent in civil litigation.

Understanding Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC: The Statutory Framework

The Court began by examining the text of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which reads:

"Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith..."

The Court emphasised that the 1976 Amendment to the CPC brought about a significant change in the law of compromise. Prior to this amendment, a compromise could be either oral or written, and the court could decide the same on the basis of general evidence by the parties. The Court referred to the landmark decision in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel (1988), where the Supreme Court had explained the pre-amendment and post-amendment position.

After the 1976 Amendment, the law became crystal clear: a compromise must be in writing and must be signed by the parties. The Court cited Som Dev v. Rati Ram (2005) to reinforce this position. The objective of the amendment, as explained by the Court, was to prevent false and frivolous pleas of compromise having been entered into between the parties.

The "Voluntary" Aspect: Heart of the Matter

The Supreme Court identified the "voluntary" aspect as the cornerstone of a valid compromise decree. A compromise, by its very nature, requires the free and informed consent of all parties. If one party has not consented — either personally or through a duly authorised representative — the compromise lacks the essential ingredient of voluntariness.

The Court referred to Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, where it was held that a compromise decree must be voluntarily accepted by the parties, and once such acceptance is recorded by the court, it acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. However, the Court cautioned that the court's role cannot be reduced to merely being a recorder. The court must apply its judicial mind to the terms of the compromise to ensure that they are lawful and that all parties have genuinely consented.

Can an Advocate Sign a Compromise on Behalf of a Client?

This was the million-dollar question. The appellants argued that since the advocate had appeared for Defendant No. 5 and had filed a vakalatnama, he had implied authority to act on behalf of his client, including entering into a compromise. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument.

The Court clarified that while a counsel, duly authorised representative, or GPA holder is permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of those he represents, this is subject to two critical conditions:

Express authorisation: There must be clear, specific, and express authorisation from the client to the advocate to enter into a compromise affecting the client's property rights.
Exigency of circumstance: In the absence of express authorisation, there must be compelling exigent circumstances that justified the advocate acting without seeking clear approval from the client.

The Court relied upon Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh to support this proposition. In both these cases, the Supreme Court had held that an advocate's general authority to represent a client in court does not extend to compromising the client's substantive legal rights without specific instructions.

In the present case, the Court found that:

"In the present case, there is no express authorisation by defendant no.5 allowing Mr. Mehta to sign the compromise on his behalf, nor is there anything on record to demonstrate the exigent circumstances which prompted the counsel to act without seeking a clear approval from defendant no.5. In absence of the aforesaid, the 'voluntary' aspect mandated by Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is essential for a compromise decree cannot be established on the record. As such, the requirements of Rule 3 have not been complied with. The resulting compromise is contrary to law."

The Court's Role in Recording a Compromise

The Supreme Court also addressed an important procedural aspect: what is the court's duty when a compromise petition is placed before it? The Court held that while it is true that the court merely puts a seal of approval on a compromise reached between the parties, its role cannot be reduced to being only a recorder.

The court has to apply its judicial mind to the terms of the compromise to ensure that:

The terms are lawful and not contrary to public policy.
All parties to the suit have genuinely consented to the compromise.
The compromise is not the result of fraud, coercion, undue influence, or misrepresentation.
The parties signing the compromise have the authority to do so.

The Court cited Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi to emphasise that a court must be satisfied that the compromise is lawful before recording it. This duty becomes even more critical when the compromise affects valuable property rights, as in the present case.

Dealing with the Delay: Can 28 Years Bar a Challenge?

One of the strongest arguments advanced by the appellants was that the challenge to the compromise decree came after an inordinate delay of 28 years. They contended that the law of limitation should bar such a belated challenge, and that allowing it would create uncertainty and unsettle settled matters.

The Supreme Court dealt with this argument with remarkable clarity. It observed that while the law of limitation is undoubtedly an important facet of the legal system, it cannot be used as a means to defeat substantive rights. The Court noted:

"The law of limitation, while undoubtedly an important facet of the legal system, cannot be used as a means to defeat substantive rights."

The Court explained that the compromise directly affected the property rights of Defendant No. 5, despite not bearing his signature. His rights in the ancestral property were compromised without his knowledge or consent. In such circumstances, the Court held that the delay of 25 years (from 1994 to 2022, when the challenge was filed) had to be given a go-by.

However, the Court was careful to add a caveat. It stated that it is not in all cases that such large delay can be set aside. Whether or not a particular case warrants overlooking such delay is to be determined after a detailed examination of the record in each case. The Court clarified:

"It is not in all cases that such large delay can be set aside. Whether or not a particular case warrants taking such a view is to be determined after a detailed examination of the record in each case."

In the present case, the Court found that the most basic facts were heavily disputed — including the relationship between the parties, their rights over the property, the defendant's knowledge of the proceedings, and the authority allegedly granted to counsel. These disputed facts could only be resolved through a full trial, not by brushing aside the challenge on the ground of delay.

Compromise Decree and Res Judicata: Why It Does Not Apply

The appellants also argued that the compromise decree, having been passed by a competent court, should operate as res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC, thereby preventing any challenge to it. The Supreme Court rejected this argument by referring to two important precedents.

In Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd. (1969), the Supreme Court had held that a consent decree does not operate as res judicata because it does not meet the requirements of Section 11 CPC. A consent decree is not a decision on the merits of the case; it is merely the court's acceptance of an agreement reached between the parties.

The Court also referred to Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma (2024), where it was held that the only remedy available against a compromise decree is a recall application. A fresh suit or an appeal is not maintainable against a compromise decree. This principle was significant because it clarified that while a compromise decree cannot be challenged by way of a fresh suit, it can certainly be recalled by the same court if it is found to be vitiated by fraud, lack of authority, or other legal defects.

The Court's reasoning on this point was clear: since the compromise decree in the present case was not based on the merits of the partition suit, but on an agreement that one party had not genuinely entered into, it could not claim the protection of res judicata.

The Final Order: What the Supreme Court Directed

After a thorough analysis of the facts, law, and precedents, the Supreme Court delivered its final order. The appeal was dismissed, and the concurrent findings of the Patna High Court and the trial court were upheld. The Court held that the compromise decree had been correctly set aside.

However, the Supreme Court did not stop there. It went a step further and directed that the issues of the partition suit require to be adjudicated in a full trial. The Court acknowledged the practical difficulties in taking a 1989 suit to trial 37 years later, but emphasised that it was not possible to decide the rights of the parties without the due process of collection and weighing of evidence.

"While we acknowledge the difficulty that may arise in 1989 suit being taken to trial 37 years later, but it is not possible to decide the rights of the parties without the due process of collection and weighing of evidence, whatever may be available."

The Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the partition dispute itself. It clarified that its judgment was limited to the validity of the compromise decree, and that the actual question of who is entitled to what share in the ancestral property of Thakur Ojha would have to be decided by the trial court after recording evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

Key Takeaways from the Judgment: Nine Principles Laid Down

The Supreme Court's judgment in Krishna Kumar Ojha is a treasure trove of legal principles that every civil lawyer must internalise. Here are the nine key propositions laid down by the Court:

Prior to the 1976 Amendment, a compromise could be either oral or written, and the court could decide the same on the basis of general evidence by the parties (Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel).
After the 1976 Amendment, it has been clarified that a compromise must be in writing and must be signed by the parties (Som Dev v. Rati Ram).
The objective of the amendment is to prevent false and frivolous pleas of compromise having been entered into between the parties (Gurpreet Singh supra).
A compromise decree being signed by all parties is a mandate of the law — this is not a mere formality but a statutory requirement (Gurpreet Singh supra).
The compromise has to be voluntarily accepted by parties, and once such acceptance is recorded by the Court, it acquires the sanctity of a judicial order (Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi).
A counsel, duly authorised representative, or GPA holder is permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of those he represents, but only if there is express authorisation or exigent circumstances (Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India; Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh).
In accepting a compromise decree, the court's role cannot be reduced to being only a recorder. It has to apply its judicial mind to the terms to ensure that they are lawful (Banwari Lal supra).
A consent decree, which is the conclusion of a compromise, does not operate as res judicata because it does not meet Section 11 CPC requirements (Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors).
The only remedy available against a compromise decree is a recall application. A fresh suit or an appeal is not maintainable against this kind of decree (Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma).

Practical Implications for Advocates and Litigants

This judgment has profound practical implications for the legal profession and litigants across India. Here is what every stakeholder needs to know:

For Advocates: The Boundaries of Professional Authority

If you are a practicing advocate handling civil matters, this judgment is a wake-up call. Your general vakalatnama does not give you the power to compromise your client's property rights. Before you even think about signing a compromise petition on behalf of a client, you must:

Obtain express written instructions from your client specifically authorising you to enter into the compromise. A general "you may do the needful" will not suffice.
Explain the terms of the compromise to your client in a language they understand. Do not assume they know the legal implications.
Get the compromise petition signed by the client wherever possible. If the client cannot sign, obtain a specific power of attorney or authorisation letter for the compromise.
Document everything. Keep a record of your client's instructions, the advice you gave, and the client's consent. This documentation can save you from professional misconduct proceedings.
Never compromise without instructions in property matters, family disputes, or any case involving substantial legal rights. The Supreme Court has made it clear: unauthorised compromises are "contrary to law."

For Litigants: Protecting Your Rights

If you are a party to a civil suit, this judgment empowers you. You now know that:

Your advocate cannot bind you to a compromise without your express consent. If you discover that your lawyer has signed a compromise petition without your knowledge, you have a legal remedy.
You can challenge a compromise decree even after many years if it was obtained without your consent or through fraud. The law of limitation may not be an absolute bar.
The remedy is a recall application before the same court that recorded the compromise. You cannot file a fresh suit, but you can ask the same court to recall its decree.
Always read the compromise petition carefully before your case is settled. Do not rely solely on your lawyer's assurance. Understand what you are giving up and what you are getting.

For Courts: The Duty of Judicial Scrutiny

The judgment also places a significant responsibility on trial courts. When a compromise petition is filed, the court must:

Verify that all parties have signed the compromise petition. Do not accept a petition signed only by advocates without checking for the parties' signatures.
Enquire whether the advocates signing on behalf of parties have express authorisation to compromise. This is especially important in property matters.
Apply judicial mind to the terms of the compromise to ensure they are lawful and not contrary to public policy.
Record the compromise only after being satisfied that it is voluntary, lawful, and duly authorised.

Comparison with Related Judgments: Where Does This Case Stand?

To fully appreciate the significance of Krishna Kumar Ojha, it is useful to compare it with other Supreme Court judgments on compromise decrees:

Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel (1988)

This case laid the foundation for understanding the 1976 Amendment to Order XXIII Rule 3. The Court held that after the amendment, a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties. Krishna Kumar Ojha builds upon this by clarifying that an advocate's signature cannot substitute for the client's signature without express authorisation.

Som Dev v. Rati Ram (2005)

The Supreme Court in this case reinforced the mandatory nature of the written and signed requirement. Krishna Kumar Ojha takes this further by holding that the absence of a party's signature — and the absence of express authorisation for the advocate to sign — renders the compromise "contrary to law."

Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India

This case recognised that an advocate or authorised representative can sign a compromise on behalf of a client, but only if there is express authorisation or exigent circumstances. Krishna Kumar Ojha applies this principle strictly and holds that in the absence of both, the compromise is invalid.

Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006)

The Supreme Court held that no appeal lies against a consent decree under Section 96(3) CPC, and no independent suit can be filed to set it aside. The only remedy is a recall application. Krishna Kumar Ojha reaffirms this while clarifying that a recall application is maintainable when the compromise is vitiated by lack of authority or fraud.

Critical Analysis: Strengths and Potential Concerns

Strengths of the Judgment

This judgment is a landmark for several reasons. First, it protects the rights of vulnerable litigants who may not be aware that their lawyers have compromised their property rights without their knowledge. Second, it strengthens the ethical framework of the legal profession by clearly demarcating the boundaries of an advocate's authority. Third, it reaffirms the principle of voluntariness as the bedrock of compromise law. Fourth, it provides a clear remedy — the recall application — for those who have been wronged by unauthorised compromises.

The judgment is also notable for its pragmatic approach to delay. Rather than applying the law of limitation mechanically, the Court recognised that when substantive rights are affected by fraud, technicalities of delay cannot be allowed to defeat justice. This is in line with the Supreme Court's broader jurisprudence on balancing procedural rigour with substantive justice.

Potential Concerns and Unresolved Questions

However, the judgment also raises some questions that may need clarification in future cases:

What constitutes "exigent circumstances"? The Court mentions that an advocate can sign a compromise without express authorisation if there are exigent circumstances, but does not define what these circumstances might be. This leaves room for interpretation and potential misuse.
How will the trial court handle a 37-year-old suit? The Court directed that the partition suit be taken to trial, but many of the original parties are deceased, documents may be lost, and witnesses may not be available. The practical challenges are immense.
What about bona fide purchasers? If the property has changed hands multiple times over 28 years, innocent third-party purchasers may be affected by the setting aside of the compromise decree. The judgment does not address this aspect.
Does this apply to all types of compromises? The judgment deals with a partition suit involving ancestral property. It remains to be seen whether the same strict standard will apply to commercial disputes, matrimonial settlements, or other types of civil cases.

How This Judgment Impacts Partition Suits in India

Partition suits are among the most common and contentious civil cases in India. They involve family property, emotional attachments, and complex relationships. The Krishna Kumar Ojha judgment has specific implications for partition litigation:

Lawyers must be extra cautious when advising clients on compromise in partition suits. The stakes are high — ancestral property, family homes, agricultural land — and clients may not fully understand what they are giving up.
Courts must scrutinise compromise petitions more carefully in partition matters. Given the family dynamics and potential for coercion, the court's duty to apply judicial mind is heightened.
Legal heirs have a remedy even decades later. If a predecessor's property rights were compromised without authority, the legal heirs can challenge the compromise decree through a recall application.
The judgment discourages hasty compromises in property matters. Parties and their lawyers may now think twice before rushing into a settlement, knowing that the Supreme Court has set a high bar for validity.

Conclusion: A Judgment That Protects the Sanctity of Consent

The judgment in Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors. (2026 INSC 662) is a powerful reminder that in civil litigation, consent is not just a formality — it is the foundation of justice. An advocate, no matter how experienced or well-intentioned, cannot substitute his judgment for that of his client when it comes to compromising valuable property rights. The Supreme Court has drawn a clear line: no express authorisation, no valid compromise.

For the legal profession, this judgment is both a caution and a guide. It cautions advocates against overstepping their authority and guides them on the importance of obtaining clear, documented instructions before entering into any compromise. For litigants, it is an affirmation that their rights cannot be taken away by unauthorised acts of their representatives. For the judiciary, it is a reaffirmation of the court's duty to apply judicial mind before recording any compromise.

The case also teaches us a broader lesson about the Indian legal system: justice delayed is not always justice denied. Even after 28 years, when fraud and lack of authority are established, the courts have the power and the duty to set right what has gone wrong. The Supreme Court's direction that the 1989 partition suit be taken to trial, despite the passage of 37 years, shows that the pursuit of truth and justice cannot be extinguished by the passage of time.

As the legal fraternity digests this judgment, one thing is clear — the era of casual compromises signed by advocates without client authorisation is over. The Supreme Court has spoken, and its words will echo in every civil courtroom in India for years to come.

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Last Updated: July 2026 | Article Published on Barristery.in | Citation: 2026 INSC 662

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AUTHOR: RABI KR. PANDIT

Hello, I am Rabi Kr. Pandit, the founder of this platform and a resident of Kolkata, India. I hold a degree in History, Political Science, and English, and I am currently pursuing my legal studies at Jogesh Chandra Chaudhary Law College under the University of Calcutta. I manage multiple educational blogs with the aim of delivering knowledge in a clear, structured, and accessible manner. My focus is on simplifying complex topics and presenting reliable information that benefits students and readers from diverse academic backgrounds.